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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to
suppress, James Edwin Wolfe pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled
substance. The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with three years
fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Wolfe on probation for a period of three
years. Mr. Wolfe appealed, asserting the district court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued Mr. Wolfe did not show any error in
the district court’s determination that the initial encounter was consensual and never
evolved into an unlawful detention, nor did he show error in the district court’s
determination that the positive drug dog alert provided probable cause to search the
motorhome pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because
Mr. Wolfe’s claim was not preserved for appeal. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-20.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to show, contrary to the State’s argument, that
Mr. Wolfe was seized in the initial encounter with the police when Deputy Nelson told
Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied. In
view of all the surrounding circumstances here, a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s
position, ordered by the deputy to “just wait in your car for me, alright? I appreciate it,”
would have believed he was not free to leave. The State’s contentions based on its
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized are unavailing.
This Reply Brief is also necessary to concede that Mr. Wolfe’s challenge to the
drug dog’s certification was not preserved for appeal.
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Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wolfe’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wolfe asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,

because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated. Contrary to the district court’s determination, Mr. Wolfe was seized when
Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and
Mr. Schabow complied with the order. The seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal because it
was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion. The taking of Mr. Schabow’s
driver’s license was unreasonable because it came after the illegal seizure. Mr. Wolfe’s
incriminating statements should have been suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous
tree. Thus, Mr. Wolfe’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated, and the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
B.

Mr. Wolfe Was Seized In The Initial Encounter With The Police When
Mr. Schabow Submitted To Deputy Nelson’s Show Of Authority By Waiting For
The Deputy In The Motorhome As The Deputy Ordered
Mr. Wolfe asserts he was seized in the initial encounter with the police when

Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and
Mr. Schabow complied. See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir.
1993); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 223 (Wyo. 1994); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131,
1133, 1135-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
The State acknowledges that “[a] seizure occurs by submission to a show of
authority where an officer orders a citizen to wait for the officer at a particular place, and
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the citizen complies with the order.” (Resp. Br., p.11 (quoting App. Br., p.12) (internal
quotation marks omitted).) The State contends Mr. Schabow voluntarily stopped the
motorhome and approached Deputy Nelson. (Resp. Br., p.12.) But the State then
argues: “That Deputy Nelson responded to Mr. Schabow’s action by stating: ‘Just wait
in your car for me.

Appreciate it.’ (Exhibit 1, 1:12 – 1:15), did not convert what

Mr. Schabow initiated as a voluntary encounter into a detention by Deputy Nelson.” 1
(Resp. Br., p.12.)
While the State impliedly recognizes actions by law enforcement may convert a
consensual encounter into a seizure, see, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03
(1983), the State’s argument that Mr. Schabow was not seized flies in the face of that
recognition.

A seizure by a show of authority occurs “only if, in view of all the

circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.” State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Deputy Nelson ordered Mr. Schabow to wait for the deputy in a
particular place by giving the following order: “Hey man, just wait in your car for me,
alright? I appreciate it.” (See R., pp.86-87; State’s Ex. A, 01:10 – 01:20.)
The State is essentially arguing that, under the circumstances surrounding this
encounter, a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position “would have felt free to leave
or otherwise decline the officer’s requests and terminate the encounter.” See State v.
Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653 (1999). But the State has not offered any legal authority in
support of its argument that a reasonable person under these surrounding

As seen above, the State did not cite any legal authority for this argument. (See Resp.
Br., p.12.) Without legal authority, the State has waived this argument, and this Court
need not consider it. See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
1
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circumstances would have felt free to leave and disregard Deputy Nelson’s order to wait
in a particular place for the deputy. As Mr. Wolfe asserted in the Appellant’s Brief
(App. Br., pp.12-13), cases from other jurisdictions instead indicate a reasonable person
under these circumstances would not have felt free to decline Deputy Nelson’s order
and terminate the encounter. See, e.g., State v. Ellwood, 757 P.2d 547, 549 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1988) (“[A] seizure did occur, as the State concedes, when Detective Deckard
told Ellwood and his companion to ‘[w]ait right here.’ At this point Ellwood and his
companion were not free to leave.” (alteration in original)).
The Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823
(Ct. App. 1992), further illustrates why the State’s conclusion is flawed. The Court in
Zubizareta held a defendant involved in a traffic stop was not seized when an officer
approached the defendant’s car, attempted to speak with him, and asked him to roll
down the window. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho at 827. Nor was the defendant seized when
the officer requested the defendant turn off his motor.

Id. at 828.

However, the

Zubizareta Court held the defendant was seized when the officer told him to “remain
seated.” Id. The officer had testified, “I just asked him to sit there—turn off his engine
and sit there, which he complied.”

Id. at 825 (internal quotation marks omitted).

According to the Court, “[a]t that time, a reasonable person in Zubizareta’s position
would have not felt free to go about his business.” Id. at 828.
By telling the defendant to remain seated, the officer in Zubizareta implicitly
ordered the defendant to wait in his car for the officer, and the defendant complied. See
id. If, as the Idaho Court of Appeals in Zubizareta held, a reasonable person under
those circumstances would have not felt free to go about his business, a reasonable
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person under the surrounding circumstances here—where Deputy Nelson explicitly
ordered Mr. Schabow to wait in his vehicle for the deputy—likewise would have not felt
free to leave. See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165. Thus, the Zubizareta decision shows the
State’s conclusion is flawed and contrary to legal authority.
The State additionally contends “the fact that Deputy Nelson did not also tell
Mr. Schabow that he was ‘free to leave’ did not change the nature of the encounter.”
(Resp. Br., p.12.) Although whether an officer tells a citizen he or she is free to leave is
not dispositive, it is one factor courts consider when analyzing all the surrounding
circumstances of an encounter with law enforcement. E.g., Royer, 460 U.S. at 503
(“Royer was never informed that he was free to board his plane if he so chose . . . .”)
Here, the fact that Deputy Nelson did not tell Mr. Schabow he was free to leave,
together with the deputy’s order to wait in the vehicle for the deputy and the rest of the
surrounding circumstances, meant a reasonable person in Mr. Schabow’s position
would have believed that he was not free to leave. See Baker, 141 Idaho at 165.
In view of the surrounding circumstances here, a reasonable person in
Mr. Schabow’s position would have believed that he was not free to leave. Contrary to
the State’s argument, Mr. Schabow was seized when Deputy Nelson told him to wait for
the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied. See Coggins, 986 F.2d at
654; Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223; Barnes, 978 P.2d at 1135-36. Deputy Nelson also seized
Mr. Wolfe at that point in the encounter with the police, because Mr. Wolfe was a
passenger in Mr. Schabow’s motorhome. See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650
(Ct. App. 2002).

The district court’s determination on when Mr. Wolfe was seized

was incorrect.
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C.

The Seizure Of Mr. Wolfe Was Illegal Because It Was Not Justified By
Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
Mr. Wolfe asserts that his seizure was illegal because it was not justified by

reasonable, articulable suspicion. Based on the totality of the circumstances known to
Deputy Nelson at or before the time of the detention, there was no reasonable suspicion
justifying Mr. Wolfe’s seizure. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009).
The State has not offered any argument or authority with respect to whether the
seizure of Mr. Wolfe was illegal (see Resp. Br., pp.8-13), and thus has waived any
argument contrary to Mr. Wolfe’s assertion. See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263 (1996).
D.

The Taking of Mr. Schabow’s Driver’s License Was Unreasonable Because It
Came After Deputy Nelson’s Illegal Seizure
Mr. Wolfe asserts the taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable

because it came after Deputy Nelson’s illegal seizure of Mr. Schabow and Mr. Wolfe.
Because the taking came after the illegal seizure, State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491
(1992), does not justify the taking.
The State’s counterargument on this point, because it is based on the State’s
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow
to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied (see Resp.
Br., pp.13-16), is unavailing. Without support from Godwin or any other justification, the
taking of Mr. Schabow’s driver’s license was unreasonable.
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E.

The Issue Of The Drug Dog’s Certification Was Not Preserved For Appeal
The State argues Mr. Wolfe’s “claim regarding the drug dog is not preserved.”

(Resp. Br., p.16.) The State contends Mr. Wolfe could have challenged the reliability of
the drug dog in his initial motion to suppress or in response to the State’s memorandum,
but did not. (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) This point is well-taken. Thus, Mr. Wolfe concedes
that his challenge to the drug dog’s certification was not preserved for appeal. See
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (Ct. App. 2000).
F.

Mr. Wolfe’s Incriminating Statements Should Have Been Suppressed As The
Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree
Mr. Wolfe asserts his incriminating statements should have been suppressed as

the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11. All of Mr. Wolfe’s
incriminating statements came after his illegal seizure by Deputy Nelson.
R., p.89.)

(See

Thus, the incriminating statements came from exploitation of the original

illegality, and should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. See Bishop, 146
Idaho at 810.
The State’s counterargument on this point, because it is based on the State’s
flawed conclusion that Mr. Wolfe was not seized when Deputy Nelson told Mr. Schabow
to wait for the deputy in the motorhome and Mr. Schabow complied (see Resp.
Br., p.20), is unavailing.

Mr. Wolfe’s incriminating statements should have been

suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Wolfe respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order which denied his
motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand the
case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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